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OPINION OF THE COURT
         
VAN ANTWERPEN, Circuit Judge.
Appellant George Flemming appeals his conviction and sentence following a jury
trial in the District of the Virgin Islands in which he was convicted of conspiracy to
commit wire fraud and program fraud, as well as seventeen counts of wire fraud and
seven counts of program fraud.  18 U.S.C. §§ 371, 1343, and 666(a)(2).  
The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 48 U.S.C. § 1612.  We have
jurisdiction over the appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a).  See
United States v. Cooper, 437 F.3d 324, 327 (3d Cir. 2006).  For the reasons set forth
below, we will affirm.
I.
Because we write solely for the parties, we set forth only those facts necessary to
1Flemming was originally charged jointly with co-defendant John.  The District
Court granted the government’s motion to sever the cases on March 15, 2006.
3
our decision.  
Flemming owned Mr. G’s Maintenance Service, Inc., a company that obtained a
contract with the Virgin Islands Housing Authority (“VIHA”) to repair 150 housing units
in St. Croix in 1998.  VIHA paid Flemming’s company periodically after it certified that
the work for which payment was being made had been satisfactorily completed.  The
company ultimately received more than $1 million under the contract.  
Co-defendant Walter John worked at the VIHA as a procurement officer.1  At trial,
the government introduced evidence that Flemming paid John various sums of money
during the life of the contract and that Flemming’s payments to John were always made
shortly after Flemming received a payment from VIHA.  Some of these payments to John
were made by check, and the government introduced copies of those checks at trial. 
Flemming also made cash payments to John, the amounts of which were evidenced by
notations in a notebook that Flemming showed to government witness James Parris.  In
total, Flemming paid John $37,000.  The government also established, through the
testimony of Yvonne Roebuck, an employee in the VIHA procurement office on St. Croix
in 1998 and 1999, that Flemming frequently visited John at his office during the life of
the contract.
James Parris, retired Captain of the Virgin Island Housing Authority Police
Department, also testified at trial.  Prior to the indictment in this case, Parris led an
4investigation into an alleged kickback scheme within the VIHA.  During the course of his
investigation, Parris interviewed Flemming on several occasions.  Parris testified that,
during the initial interview, Flemming admitted making monetary payments to John and
told Parris that the money he gave John was a loan.  However, in a subsequent interview,
Flemming stated that he and John had an agreement that Flemming would pay John $500
for each unit the company repaired.
Symrah Christopher, an employee in the VIHA accounting department, testified at
trial that John telephoned her and asked her to expedite payments to Flemming’s
company.  She explained that on several occasions subsequent to that telephone call, John
would send a package to her attention.  The package contained a smaller envelope with
money and a larger envelope with paperwork to process the payments to Flemming’s
company.   Christopher testified that she received a total of $250 from John to expedite
payments, and that several expedited payments were in fact made and sent out ahead of
payments to other vendors.  
Flemming took the stand in his defense.  He admitted that he made monetary
payments to John, but he claimed that those payments were a loan.  Flemming
consistently testified that John asked to borrow money because two of John’s family
members were sick and that he agreed to lend John money when he had money in his
account, i.e. when he received payments from VIHA.  Flemming denied that he ever paid
John to request expedited payments from VIHA or that he had any knowledge that John
paid anyone working for VIHA to expedite payments on his behalf.
5On August 12, 2004, a grand jury returned a thirty two-count superseding
indictment charging Flemming with one count of Conspiracy in violation of 18 U.S.C. §
371, seventeen counts of Wire Fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1343, and seven counts
of Program Fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 666(a)(2). On July 20, 2006, after a four-day
trial, the jury returned a guilty verdict as to all counts.  On November 17, 2006, the Court
sentenced Flemming to 24 months’ imprisonment.  This timely appeal followed.
II.
Flemming raises five issues on appeal.  First, he argues the District Court
erroneously denied his Rule 29 motion for acquittal or, in the alternative, for a new trial. 
Second, he alleges the District Court abused its discretion by refusing to hold an
evidentiary hearing regarding allegations that one juror considered extrajudicial
information and that another juror misunderstood the burden of proof.  Third, Flemming
claims the District Court abused its discretion when it refused to allow him to introduce
evidence of a document allegedly signed by John and acknowledging a debt to Flemming. 
Fourth, Flemming argues the District Court should have dismissed the indictment for
failure to specify the “intangible” honest service that was part of the scheme to defraud. 
Finally, Flemming challenges the reasonableness of his sentence.  We address each issue
in turn.
A.
Flemming first challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting all counts of
his conviction.  Specifically, Flemming argues that Christopher’s testimony does not
6establish that he knew John requested expedited payments on his behalf or that he gave
John money to improperly influence him to expedite payments.  The District Court
concluded there was “substantial evidence from which the jury could find guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt on all counts.”  J.A. at 88.  We agree with the District Court and will
affirm the convictions.
Our review of Flemming’s insufficiency of the evidence claim is “particularly
deferential” to the jury’s determination. United States v. Peppers, 302 F.3d 120, 125 (3d
Cir. 2002) (internal quotation and citation omitted).  We must sustain the jury’s verdict “if
there is substantial evidence, taking the view most favorable to the Government, to
support it.”  United States v. Voigt, 89 F.3d 1050, 1080 (3d Cir. 1996) (internal quotation
and citation omitted).  That is, the jury’s verdict must stand if “any rational trier of fact
could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.”  Id.
(quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979)) (emphasis in original).  “It is not
for us to weigh the evidence or to determine the credibility of the witnesses.”  Id. (internal
quotation and citation omitted).  Overall, “a claim of insufficiency of the evidence places
a very heavy burden on an appellant.”  United States v. Gonzalez, 918 F.2d 1129, 1132
(3d Cir. 1990) (internal quotation and citation omitted).
To prove a conspiracy to defraud the United States in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371,
the government was required to establish: “(1) the existence of an agreement; (2) an overt
act by one of the conspirators in furtherance of the objective; and (3) an intent on the part
of the conspirators to agree as well as to defraud the United States.”  United States v.
7Gambone, 314 F.3d 163, 167 (3d Cir. 2003) (citation omitted).  The government may rely
entirely on circumstantial evidence to establish a conspiracy.  However, “the inferences
drawn must have a logical and convincing connection to the facts established.”  United
States v. Carr, 25 F.3d 1194, 1201 (3d Cir. 1994) (internal quotation and citation
omitted).  The superseding indictment described two ways in which Flemming conspired
with John to “make as much money as possible from the Virgin Islands Government by
corruptly securing payments” on the contract: (1) to secure payments that exceeded the
average cost to repair the units; and (2) to expedite payments under the contract.  J.A. at
13-14.  The Government has conceded that it did not introduce evidence to support a
conspiracy as to (1).  However, we will uphold the conviction if the evidence was
sufficient as to either of the alleged objects of the conspiracy.  Carr, 25 F.3d at 1201-02.
It is undisputed that Flemming made numerous monetary payments to John
throughout 1998 and 1999.  Captain Parris testified that Flemming admitted to having an
agreement with John whereby he would pay John $500 for each unit repaired under the
contract.  Although Flemming explained that the payments to John were a loan, it is for
the jury to weigh the evidence and determine the credibility of witnesses.  Voigt, 89 F.3d
at 1080.  The government also proved an overt act through Christopher, who testified that
John paid her $250 to expedite payments to Flemming’s company.  Christopher also
confirmed that payments to Flemming were in fact expedited ahead of payments to other
vendors.  Moreover, the government introduced copies of checks Flemming paid to John
and a notebook detailing additional cash payments made to John.  Based on the evidence
2Congress enacted § 1346 in response to the Supreme Court’s decision in McNally
v. United States, 483 U.S. 350 (1987).  In McNally, the Supreme Court held that the mail
and wire fraud statutes were limited to the protection of property rights and did not reach
schemes to defraud citizens of the intangible right to a public official’s honest services. 
United States v. Panarella, 277 F.3d 678, 690 (3d Cir. 2002).  Section 1346 “was enacted
to overturn McNally and restore the evolution of mail and wire fraud to its pre-McNally
status.”  United States v. Antico, 275 F.3d 245, 262 (3d Cir. 2001).
8
presented, the jury could logically infer that Flemming and John intended to work
together to achieve the common goal of defrauding the VIHA by expediting payments to
Flemming’s company ahead of payments to other vendors.  
Flemming was also convicted of wire fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1343,
which provides, in relevant part: “Whoever, having devised . . . any scheme or artifice to
defraud, . . . transmits . . . by means of wire . . . in interstate or foreign commerce, any
writings, signs, signals, pictures, or sounds for the purpose of executing such scheme or
artifice, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.” 
Section 1346 defines the term “scheme or artifice to defraud” to include “a scheme or
artifice to deprive another of the intangible right of honest services.”2  We have
recognized that honest services fraud “typically occurs in two scenarios: (1) bribery,
where a legislator was paid for a particular decision or action; or (2) failure to disclose a
conflict of interest resulting in personal gain.”  United States v. Antico, 275 F.3d 245, 262
(3d Cir. 2001).  To sustain Flemming’s conviction for honest services fraud, the
government was required prove “(1) [Flemming’s] knowing and willful participation in a
scheme or artifice to defraud, (2) with the specific intent to defraud, and (3) the use of the
3Subsection (a) of the statute states that a violation occurs “if the circumstances
described in subsection (b) of this section exist.”  Subsection (b) requires that the
organization, government, or agency in question receive more than $10,000 in federal
assistance in a one-year period.  Testimony at trial established that VIHA received more
than $10,000 in federal funding from the United States Department of Housing and Urban
Development in 1998 and 1999.  Accordingly, the government established that the
condition in subsection (b) of 18 U.S.C. § 666 was satisfied.
9
mails or interstate wire communications in furtherance of the scheme.”  Id. at 261.  
As described above, a reasonable jury could infer from the established facts and
circumstantial evidence that Flemming and John knowingly and willfully participated in a
scheme to expedite VIHA payments to Flemming’s company.  The jury could also
logically conclude that the money Flemming paid John was intended to influence John in
this regard, thereby depriving the citizens of the Virgin Islands of the honest services of a
VIHA employee.  The government also elicited testimony establishing that the checks
were processed in interstate commerce through electronic wires.
To sustain a conviction for program fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 666(a)(2), the
government was required to prove that Flemming “corruptly [gave] . . . anything of value
to any person, with intent to influence or reward an agent of an organization or of a State,
local or Indian tribal government, or any agency thereof, in connection with any business
. . . of such organization, government, or agency involving anything of value of $5,000 or
more . . . .”3  As with the wire fraud conviction, the evidence is sufficient for a reasonable
jury to find that Flemming corruptly gave John money to influence John to expedite
payments to Flemming’s company under the contract.
4Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 33(a) provides that “[u]pon the defendant’s
motion, the court may vacate any judgment and grant a new trial if the interest of justice
so requires.” 
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Accordingly, we conclude that a rational trier of fact could find beyond a
reasonable doubt that Flemming engaged in a conspiracy to expedite payments to his
company, and that he committed wire fraud and program fraud in carrying out this
scheme.
B.
Flemming next challenges the District Court’s denial of his Rule 33 motion for a
new trial.4  Flemming bases this claim on an affidavit from his brother, Sinclair
Flemming, in which Sinclair Flemming states that he spoke to two jurors after the guilty
verdict was returned, and further attests to the following:
[J]uror no. 141, indicated to me that she convicted Defendant on all counts because
she has a sister who works with the Federal Government, and her sister told her
that it is a violation of Federal Laws for anyone to give anything of value to an
employee of a Government Agency which received Federal funds. . . . [Juror no.
141’s] sister apparently provided her with the information during trial. . . . 
A second juror . . . juror no. 163 indicated that she and her fellow jurors
determined that Defendant Flemming was guilty because he did not meet the
burden of proof to convince them he was innocent.
J.A. at 68-69. 
 Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b) provides:  
Upon an inquiry into the validity of a verdict or indictment, a juror may not testify
as to any matter or statement occurring during the course of the jury’s
deliberations or to the effect of anything upon that or any other juror’s mind or
emotions as influencing the juror to assent to or dissent from the verdict or
11
indictment or concerning the juror’s mental processes in connection therewith,
except that a juror may testify on the question of whether extraneous prejudicial
information was improperly brought to the jury’s attention or whether any outside
influence was improperly brought to bear upon any juror.
See also Tanner v. United States, 483 U.S. 107, 121 (1987) (explaining that Rule 606(b)
codifies the common law no impeachment rule and the exception for extraneous
influences).  In general, “we do not permit jurors to impeach their own verdicts.”  United
States v. Lloyd, 269 F.3d 228, 237 (3d Cir. 2001).  This rule is intended to “promote
finality of verdicts, encourage free deliberation among jurors, and maintain the integrity
of the jury as a judicial decision-making body.”  Id. (internal quotation and citation
omitted).  However, because “[a] criminal defendant is entitled to a determination of his
or her guilt by an unbiased jury based solely upon evidence properly admitted against him
or her[,] . . . a court may inquire into the verdict if extraneous prejudicial information was
improperly brought to the jury’s attention or [if] any outside influence was improperly
brought to bear upon any juror.”  Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted). 
The District Court found that any inquiry into juror no. 163’s alleged
misunderstanding of the burden of proof was barred by Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b).
We agree.  As discussed above, Rule 606(b) does not permit a court to inquire into the
validity of the jury’s verdict absent an allegation related to extraneous prejudicial
information or improper outside influences.   
With respect to the claim that juror no. 141 was improperly influenced by
extraneous information, the District Court declined to hold an evidentiary hearing because
12
it determined Flemming had not met his burden of showing substantial prejudice.  Our
review of the District Court’s finding that extraneous information did not prejudice
Flemming is for an abuse of discretion.  Lloyd, 269 F.3d at 237 (citation omitted).  We are
mindful of the “considerable deference” appellate courts traditionally give to a district
court’s determination of “the prejudicial effect of extraneous information on a jury’s
verdict.”  Id. at 243.
A new trial should be granted where the defendant demonstrates that he likely
suffered “‘substantial prejudice’ as a result of the jury’s exposure to the extraneous
information.”  Id. at 238 (citation omitted).  “In examining for prejudice, we must conduct
an objective analysis by considering the probable effect of the allegedly prejudicial
information on a hypothetical average juror[,]” id. (internal quotation and citation
omitted), and thus we do not consider “the subjective effect of such information on the
particular jurors.” Id. at 237 (internal quotation and citation omitted). We apply a
presumption of prejudice only when the extraneous information “is of a considerably
serious nature.”  Id. at 238.  Several factors relevant to our determination include whether
the extraneous information relates to an element of the case decided against the moving
party, “the extent of the jury’s exposure to the extraneous information,” “the time at
which the jury receives the extraneous information,” and whether the district court
properly instructed the jury to consider only evidence presented at trial.  Id. at 239-40.
We agree with the District Court that Flemming failed to show that he likely
suffered substantial prejudice as a result of the extraneous information provided to juror
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no. 141.  Sinclair Flemming’s affidavit does not establish when juror no. 141 received the
extraneous information, but merely speculates that juror no. 141 received it during the
trial.  Furthermore, it does not allege that juror no. 141 shared this information with any
other member of the jury.  Finally, the District Court properly instructed the jury, prior to
deliberations, that “[a]nything you may have seen or heard outside the courtroom is not
evidence in this case.”  J.A. at 198-99.  It further explained that “[t]he evidence you are to
consider in rendering a verdict in this case is the testimony of the witnesses, and the
documents or exhibits that have been admitted into evidence.”  J.A. at 199.
Putting aside any subjective effect the extraneous information had on juror no.
141, as we must under Rule 606(b), we believe this information would not have had an
impact on the hypothetical average juror’s vote in Flemming’s case. Accordingly, we
conclude the District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying Flemming’s Rule 33
motion.  Id. at 243.
C.
Flemming next asserts the District Court erred by refusing to admit evidence of a
written statement, made and signed by John, which he claims was relevant to support his
defense that the money he gave to John was a loan.  Where it is based on a permissible
interpretation of the Federal Rules of Evidence, we review the District Court’s decision to
admit or exclude evidence for abuse of discretion.  United States v. Sada, 212 F.3d 210,
215 (3d Cir. 2000) (citation omitted).
Under Federal Rule of Evidence 802, hearsay is not admissible unless it falls
5It appears that Flemming alternatively argues that the District Court’s exclusion of
the written statement deprived him of his constitutional right to present a complete
defense, even if the statement was otherwise inadmissible on hearsay grounds.  See
generally Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 302 (1973) (recognizing that “where
constitutional rights directly affecting the ascertainment of guilt are implicated, the
hearsay rule may not be applied mechanistically to defeat the ends of justice”).  We find
no merit in this contention.  To establish a constitutional violation in these circumstances,
a defendant must show: (1) he was deprived of the opportunity to present evidence in his
favor; (2) the excluded testimony would have been material and favorable to his defense;
and (3) the deprivation was arbitrary or disproportionate to any legitimate evidentiary or
procedural purpose.  Gov’t of Virgin Islands v. Mills, 956 F.2d 443, 446 (3d Cir. 1992). 
Even assuming the written statement was material and favorable to Flemming’s  defense,
the District Court’s ruling clearly was not arbitrary or disproportionate to any legitimate
evidentiary or procedural purpose.  Cf. Chambers, 410 U.S. at 302 (exclusion of hearsay
statement improper where statement “bore persuasive assurances of trustworthiness and
thus was well within the basic rationale of the [hearsay] exception for declarations against
14
within a recognized exception.  Hearsay is an out of court statement, either oral or
written, offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted.  Fed. R. Evid. 801(a), (c).  
The statement at issue, which was signed only by co-defendant John,
acknowledges that John borrowed money from Flemming and planned to pay the money
back in the near future.  John did not testify as a witness at Flemming’s trial. 
Accordingly, the document is an out of court statement.  Furthermore, as suggested by his
brief, Flemming intended to introduce the written statement as exculpatory evidence to
corroborate his defense that the payments he made to John were a loan.  As such, he was
attempting to offer it as evidence of the truth of the matter asserted in it, i.e., that he had a
loan with John.  Because the written statement is classic hearsay, and Flemming has
pointed to no exception to the hearsay rule that would permit him to introduce it, the
District Court did not abuse its discretion in excluding this evidence at trial.5  See Taylor
interest,” even though it technically did not fall within the exception). 
15
v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 410-11 (1988) (holding that “[t]he accused does not have an
unfettered right to offer testimony that is incompetent, privileged, or otherwise
inadmissible under standard rules of evidence”).
D.
Next, Flemming disputes the sufficiency of the superseding indictment as to count
one, conspiracy, and counts two through eighteen, charging him with wire fraud for theft
of honest services.  He alleges the indictment failed to plead sufficiently particular facts
supporting the intangible property he deprived the Virgin Islands Housing Authority of in
the wire fraud scheme, and that this failure also affects the conspiracy charge.  We review
the sufficiency of an indictment de novo.  United States v. Al Hedaithy, 392 F.3d 580,
587 (3d Cir. 2004); Virgin Islands v. Pemberton, 813 F.2d 626, 631 (3d Cir. 1987). 
In examining the sufficiency of a charging document, we must determine
“whether the indictment or information contains the elements of the offense intended to
be charged and sufficiently apprises the defendant of what he must be prepared to meet.” 
Pemberton, 813 F.2d at 631 (internal quotations and citations omitted).  Additionally, for
charges of fraud or conspiracy, specific intent crimes, the indictment must charge “with
particularity” the facts supporting the offense.  Al Hedaithy, 392 F.3d at 587 (requiring
proof of specific intent for both mail and wire fraud); United States v. Applewhaite, 195
F.3d 679, 684 (3d Cir. 1999) (requiring specific intent to commit unlawful act in
16
conspiracy charges); Pemberton, 813 F.2d at 631 (requiring pleading with particularity
for specific intent crimes). 
The District Court properly found that the superseding indictment was sufficient
when it charged the disputed counts.  Flemming’s claim that the indictment did not
properly identify the intangible services of John that were denied to the VIHA as a result
of the scheme is wholly unsupported by a reading of the indictment.  The description of
the scheme in the wire fraud counts specifically states that the defendants’ scheme
involved “corruptly securing payment on a contract for public housing project repair
work in exchange for reward payments.”  J.A. at 20.  The indictment further specified
that this scheme “[d]eprived the Virgin Islands government and its citizens of their right
to the honest services of an agent of the Virgin Islands when WALTER JOHN, JR. . . .
obtained an interest in GEORGE FLEMMING’S efforts to secure a payments [sic] on the
VIHA housing repair contract . . . .”  J.A. at 22.  The indictment also delineates the
operation of the scheme immediately prior to the charging paragraph for honest services
wire fraud, stating that a revenue sharing arrangement existed and that Flemming paid
John for “assistance” in securing payment on his government contract.  J.A. at 21.  The
indictment supports the arrangement between John and Flemming with particular facts,
such as the date and amount of checks and the substance of the government contract work
in question. 
Accordingly, the District Court correctly denied Flemming’s motion to dismiss the
superseding indictment.
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E.
Finally, Flemming challenges the reasonableness of his sentence.  Specifically, he
asserts the District Court did not properly analyze the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. §
3553(a) and did not provide sufficient reasons for his above-Guidelines sentence.  The
District Court calculated the advisory Guidelines range to be between 15 and 21 months’
imprisonment, and it sentenced Flemming to 24 months, followed by three years of
supervised release, a $15,000 fine, and a $3,200 special assessment.
In evaluating the reasonableness of a sentence, we determine whether: (1) the
court gave “meaningful consideration” to the § 3553(a) factors and any meritorious
grounds properly raised by the parties; and (2) whether those factors were “reasonably
applied to the circumstances of the case.”  Cooper, 437 F.3d at 329-30.  In conducting
this review, we look to the entire sentencing transcript, and “we will not elevate form
over substance.”  United States v. Dragon, 471 F.3d 501, 506 (3d Cir. 2006). 
Furthermore, we apply a deferential standard, as “the trial court [is] in the best position to
determine the appropriate sentence in light of the particular circumstances of the case.” 
Cooper, 437 F.3d at 330.  The party challenging the sentence bears the burden to show
unreasonableness.  Id. at 332.
An independent review of the record confirms the District Court’s sentence was
reasonable.  At the sentencing hearing, the District Judge properly calculated the
appropriate Guidelines range, acknowledged the Guidelines are advisory, stated he must
take the § 3553(a) factors into account, and expressly listed those factors.  He then
18
reviewed the circumstances of Flemming’s case, noted the seriousness of the offenses,
and commented on the impact those offenses had on the citizens of the Virgin Islands. 
Although it could have been more thorough, the District Judge provided a sufficient
statement, on the record, for imposing the above-Guidelines sentence of 24 months’
imprisonment:
I must also fashion a sentence that is sufficient but not greater than necessary, and
in doing so I must take into account the factors set forth under Title 18, United
States Code, Section 3553(a).  Those factors are as follows: The nature and
circumstance of the offense and the history and characteristics of you the
Defendant; the seriousness of the offense; the need to promote respect for the law;
the need to provide a just punishment for the offense; the need to afford adequate
deterrence to criminal conduct; the need to protect the public from further crimes
of you the Defendant; the need to provide you the Defendant with any needed
educational or vocational training, medical care, or other correctional treatment in
the most effective manner and the kind of sentences available.  
Mr. Flemming, you have committed some very serious crimes.  Paying money
under the table to a government official is something that cannot be countenanced. 
You have attempted and did deprive the people of the Virgin Islands of the honest
services of one of its public servants, that is, Walter John.  Your crimes clearly
caused the citizenry to lose confidence in the integrity and fairness of the Virgin
Islands Housing Authority, to lose confidence in the contracting system, and lose
confidence in vital services performed by the Virgin Islands Housing Authority.
Under the circumstances of this matter to which I’ve given a lot of thought, I’m
going to commit you into custody of the Attorney General of the United States for
a period of imprisonment of 24 months.  I do so because in my view that sentence
reflects the seriousness of your offenses, will act as a deterrent to such criminal
conduct, and will also promote respect for the law.
J.A. at 646.  Accordingly, the sentence was reasonable.
III.
We have considered all other arguments made by the parties on appeal, and
19
conclude that no further discussion is necessary.  For the foregoing reasons, we will
affirm the conviction and sentence entered by the District Court.
